

Systemic Risk and the Mathematics of Falling Dominoes

Reimer Kühn

Disordered Systems Group
Department of Mathematics
King's College London

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- Avalanches can occur, if dominoes are set too closely.

Risk and Falling Dominoes



Operational Risk



Domino Theory & Spread of Communism



Blackouts in Power Grids



Financial Crisis

Fundamental Problem of Risk Analysis

Estimate **likelihood and potential losses** due to

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- rare fluctuations in cash-flows, requiring short term acquisition of funds to maintain liquidity ↔ **liquidity risk**

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
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 - Fat tails in loss distributions
 - Volatility clustering in markets (intermittency)



Operational Risks — Interacting Processes

- Conceptualise organisation as a **network of processes**
- Two state model: processes either up and running ($n_i = 0$) or down ($n_i = 1$)
- Reliability of processes and degree of functional interdependence **heterogeneous** across the set of processes; connectivity & concept of neighbourhood **functionally** defined

⇒ **model defined on random graph**



- losses determined (randomly) each time a process goes down

Dynamics – Mathematics of Falling Dominoes

- Processes need support to keep running (energy, human resources, material, information, input from other processes, etc.)
- h_{it} total support received by process i at time t

$$h_{it} = h_i^* - \sum_j J_{ij} n_{jt} + x_{it}$$



- h_i^* support in fully functional environment
 - J_{ij} support to process i provided by process j
 - x_{it} random (e.g. Gaussian white noise).
- process i will fail, if the total support for it falls below a critical threshold (if $h_{it} \leq 0$ – domino falls, if kicked too strongly)

$$n_{it+\Delta t} = \Theta\left(\sum_j J_{ij} n_{jt} - h_i^* - x_{it}\right)$$

Probability that a Domino Falls

- Probability of failure/probability of domino falling

$$\text{Prob}(n_{it+\Delta t} = 1 | \mathbf{n}(t)) = \int_{-\infty}^{\sum_j J_{ij} n_{jt} - h_i^*} dx p(x) \equiv \Phi\left(\sum_j J_{ij} n_{jt} - h_i^*\right)$$



- **unconditional** and **conditional** probability of failure

$$p_i = \Phi(-h_i^*)$$
$$p_{i|j} = \Phi\left(J_{ij} - h_i^*\right)$$

A Simple Homogeneous Process Network

- Large system $1 \leq i \leq N$, ($N \gg 1$), with all-to-all couplings, and $h_i^* = h^*$ independent of i .

$$J_{ij} = \frac{J_0}{N}, \quad \forall (i, j) \quad \Rightarrow \quad \sum_j J_{ij} n_{jt} = \frac{J_0}{N} \sum_j n_{jt} = J_0 m_t$$

- Dynamics

$$n_{it+\Delta t} = \Theta\left(\sum_j J_{ij} n_{jt} - h_i^* - x_{it}\right) = \Theta\left(J_0 m_t - h^* - x_{it}\right).$$


Thus by Law of Large Numbers (LLN)

$$m_{t+\Delta t} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \Theta\left(J_0 m_t - h^* - x_{it}\right) \simeq \Phi\left(J_0 m_t - h^*\right)$$

Analysis of the Dynamics

- Iterated function dynamics


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


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


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


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


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


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


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 - Answer: chain-rule $\frac{d}{dx}\Phi(ax) = a\Phi'(ax)$
- For not too small values of h^* can vary between lower and upper curve in above diagram (i.e. between system with only low- m , via system with coexisting low- m and high- m states, to system with only high- m states) by increasing J_0 . For small h^* have only high- m state.

Summary

- We found that networks can be destabilized by large degrees of interdependency (large J_0) even if all processes are very **reliable** (with large h^*).
- For intermediate levels of dependency (intermediate J_0), functioning and dysfunctional states of the system coexist.
- (Not shown): In systems with finite N , a functioning state can spontaneously switch to the dysfunctional state (without an apparent 'big' perturbation.)
- Results qualitatively unchanged for heterogeneous networks (not all-to-all interactions, heterogeneous levels of reliability, heterogeneous mutual dependency)
- Similar methods for credit risk.